Where Flippers Buy Houses at Half Price
Philadelphia's median flipped home sold for 105 percent more than the flipper paid, yet market appreciation over the hold explains just 4 points of it. Across 377 cities (postal areas) with at least 150 flips in our repeat-sale deed data, the median gross flip margin ran 37.3 percent while market drift contributed a median of 4.4 points. The rest was made at purchase: in the top cities, flippers bought at roughly half the citywide median home price.

The median flipped home in Philadelphia sold for 105 percent more than the flipper paid for it. Read that fast and it sounds like the easiest trade in America: buy a property, hold it ten months, sell it for double.
Our deed records tell a less magical and far more useful story. That 105 percent gross margin was created almost entirely on the day of purchase, not the day of sale. Set the median Philadelphia flip against the city it sold into: the implied purchase price was roughly $119,000 in a city (postal area) where the median home sold for $245,000. The margin is not a rising market doing the work, and it is not renovation alchemy on its own. It is a deep discount at entry plus the value the renovation added, measured before a single renovation dollar comes out.
We tested that claim across 377 cities (postal areas), each with at least 150 detected flips in our repeat-sale deed data, and the result is unusually clean: market appreciation explains almost none of the flip margin, anywhere.
Market appreciation explains almost none of it
The comfortable explanation for fat flip margins is a hot market: buy anything, wait, and the market does the work. Our national flip study found a median gross flip margin of 37.3 percent with a median hold of 10.3 months, so we asked how much of that margin the market itself delivered.
For every city we computed a drift term: the city's median annual realized appreciation, taken from the same repeat-sale deed corpus behind our appreciation study, multiplied by the median flip hold in years. If flippers were simply riding the market, drift would eat most of the margin.
It ate almost nothing. Across the 377 cities, the drift term spanned 1.6 to 9.9 points with a median of 4.4 points, against a median gross margin of 37.3 percent. Subtract drift from every city's margin and the excess that remains had a median of +32.5 points, with the middle half of cities running from +19.7 to +45.0 points. And the subtraction barely reshuffles anyone: the rank correlation between raw margin and drift-adjusted excess is 0.997. The cities with the biggest margins earned them, in an accounting sense, from something other than the market's rise.
The cities where flips cleared the market by nearly 100 points
Here is the top of the ranking by excess over drift. All figures are city-level medians; gross margin is before renovation and transaction costs.
| Rank | City (postal area) | Flips | Median gross margin | Drift over the hold | Excess over drift |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Philadelphia, PA | 2,260 | 105.0% | 4.0 pts | +101.0 pts |
| 2 | Detroit, MI | 1,937 | 101.1% | 3.0 pts | +98.1 pts |
| 3 | Baltimore, MD | 1,555 | 99.3% | 3.0 pts | +96.3 pts |
What a 105 percent margin actually means
A 105 percent gross margin does not mean money doubled on renovations. It means the entry price was roughly half the exit price. If the median flip in each city resold at that city's median home price, the implied purchases look like this:
| City (postal area) | Implied median flip purchase | Citywide median home price | Discount at entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| Philadelphia, PA | ~$119,000 | $245,000 | about half |
| Detroit, MI | ~$44,000 | $90,000 | about half |
| Baltimore, MD | ~$130,000 | $260,000 | about 50 percent below market |
| Gulf Shores, AL | ~$430,000 | $472,000 | about 9 percent below market |
Two honesty notes belong right here. First, every margin in this study is gross: it is the resale price against the purchase price, before renovation costs, transaction costs, and carrying costs. Renovation spend is a much larger share of a $44,000 Detroit purchase than of a $430,000 Gulf Shores purchase, so gross overstates net most in exactly the cities where the headline numbers look fattest. Second, citywide medians here cover homes broadly (houses, condos, townhomes), and the implied purchase prices are arithmetic from the margin, shown to make the percentages concrete.
Distress is the engine
If drift does not explain the ranking, what does? The strongest correlate we found is the share of closed-sale listings written in distress language, the "as-is", "TLC", "investor special" vocabulary we cataloged in our Distress Language Index across 4,907,807 closed-sale descriptions. The rank correlation between a city's excess-over-drift and its distress-language share is +0.71, stronger than any other variable we tested. For scale, the median city's distress-language share is 3.21 percent, and the most distress-heavy market in the country, Camden, NJ, ran 23.27 percent.
The mechanism is not mysterious. Cities where a large slice of sales closed with distress language are cities where flippers found homes selling far below the citywide median: estates, code violations, long-deferred maintenance. The purchase discount that becomes the flip margin is, mostly, the distress discount.
Cheap cities inflate the percentages
One more correction keeps this honest. Excess-over-drift correlates -0.51 with a city's price level. The cheapest quartile of cities posted a median excess of 50.5 points against 23.7 points for the priciest quartile, and 18 of the top 20 cities had median home prices below $350,000. Percentage margins mechanically inflate when the denominator is small: the same dollar discount is a much bigger percentage of a cheap home.
We can put a number on it. After removing the price-level baseline statistically, Philadelphia kept +60.6 points of its +101.0, meaning about 40 percent of Philadelphia's headline is cheap-market baseline, the margin any city at that price level tended to show. The other 60 points are Philadelphia's own distress-and-renovation economics. Real, but smaller than the raw table suggests.
The city we threw out
One name is deliberately missing: we excluded Bethesda, MD, because its apparent 124 percent "flip margins" (161 pairs) are teardown and new-construction cycles rather than flips, verified in the deed records as a modest sale followed 12 to 15 months later by a 2.4x to 2.9x resale of a structure whose year built equals the resale year. That left 377 of the 378 qualifying cities.
What we measured
Flips are purchase-and-resale deed pairs with the resale closing in 2023 or later, from the same national repeat-sale corpus (6,963,756 deed pairs) behind our appreciation study. A city qualified with at least 150 detected flips and a qualifying appreciation entry: 378 cities passed, Bethesda, MD was excluded as described above, and 377 were analyzed. Gross flip margin is the percentage gain from purchase price to resale price (resale minus purchase, as a percent of the purchase price), before renovation, transaction, and carrying costs; drift is the city's median annual realized appreciation multiplied by its median hold in years; excess is margin minus drift. Citywide median prices cover homes (houses, condos, townhomes) from a 12-month window of closed sales, and distress-language shares come from the same 4,907,807 scanned closed-sale descriptions. National figures quoted here are medians of city medians, not pooled sale-level medians. Data snapshots were taken 2026-08-14 and 2026-08-17. Everything in this study is realized history from closed transactions, not a forecast.
What this means if you flip
The margin is made at the purchase. Market drift contributed a median of 4.4 points to a 37.3 percent median gross margin; the rest was bought at entry and built in renovation. So chase acquisition channels, not appreciation forecasts: the top cities here are the ones where deeply discounted purchases actually closed, at scale, in the deed record. Read percentage margins skeptically in cheap markets, because part of a 100-point margin is the denominator, and renovation costs claim a bigger share of gross there. And underwrite the exit like an appraiser, not an optimist: our guide to ARV covers how to anchor the resale side so the discount you think you bought is one you can realize.
Half price at the courthouse door, sweat in the middle, and a market that mostly watched. That is what the deed records say flipping has actually been.
Related studies
This article is part of a four-study series from the same closed-sale corpus: How Much Will My House Be Worth in 10 Years? The 3 Percent Rule Is Off by Nearly Half, What a Fixer-Upper Really Sells For: The 20.5% As-Is Discount, Measured in 580 Cities, and The Fixer-Upper Pipeline Map: Distress-Heavy Cities Posted 3.5x the Flip Margins.
Frequently Asked Questions
How do house flippers actually make money?
Mostly at the purchase, not from a rising market. Across 377 US cities (postal areas) with at least 150 detected flips in repeat-sale deed records, the median gross flip margin was 37.3 percent, and market appreciation over the median hold contributed only about 4.4 percentage points of it. The rest came from buying below market, often at distress discounts, plus the value the renovation added. Those margins are gross, before renovation and transaction costs.
What is a typical gross profit margin on a house flip?
The national median gross flip margin was 37.3 percent, measured as the median of city-level medians across cities with at least 150 detected flips, with a median hold of 10.3 months. That figure is gross: it compares resale price to purchase price before renovation, transaction, and carrying costs, so realized net profit is meaningfully lower, especially in cheap markets where renovation spend is a large share of the purchase price.
What are the best cities to flip houses?
By realized gross margins in deed records, Philadelphia led our ranking of cities (postal areas) with a 105 percent median gross margin across 2,260 flips, followed by Detroit at 101.1 percent and Baltimore at 99.3 percent. Two cautions apply: these are gross margins before renovation costs, and percentage margins run mechanically higher in low-priced cities. Roughly 40 percent of Philadelphia's headline figure reflects its cheap-market baseline rather than anything unique to its flippers.
Why are flip margins so much higher in cheap cities?
Two reasons. First, cheap cities tend to have more distressed sales: the correlation between a city's drift-adjusted flip margin and its distress-language share in closed-sale descriptions is +0.71, the strongest relationship in the study. Second, percentages inflate on small denominators, and drift-adjusted margins correlate -0.51 with city price level: the cheapest quartile of cities posted a median excess of 50.5 points versus 23.7 points for the priciest. Renovation costs also consume more of the gross margin in cheap cities, so the net gap is smaller than the gross gap.

About the author
Jeffrey Batista
Jeffrey Batista is the founder of Resideline, a real estate technology company building institutional grade valuation and investment analysis tools for real estate investors.
A software engineer with more than 10 years of experience, Jeffrey has worked across full stack development, infrastructure, data engineering, machine learning, and large scale systems. He left his engineering career to build Resideline full time.
Jeffrey is also a real estate investor with nearly a decade of hands on experience buying, renovating, managing, and analyzing residential properties. His experience on both sides of the industry, as an engineer and an investor, led him to build Resideline after seeing how fragmented and outdated many of the tools available to individual investors were.
Today, he leads the development of Resideline's proprietary data infrastructure, automated valuation models, rental analytics, and investment underwriting technology.
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